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Hurricanes and the Shaping of
Circum-Caribbean Societies
by Stuart B. Schwartz
Temporal, temporal, all5 viene el temporal.
~ Q u seri
e de mi Borinken, cuando llegue el temporal?
Hurricane, hurricane, here comes the storm.
What will become of my Puerto Rico when the hurricane arrives?

E

very Puerto Rican knows this plena and can sing its chorus,
and on that island where, from July to October, everyone frequently checks the weather reports and looks to the sky, the
song seems to describe a generic situation, a way of life, and a common reality. Few people today remember that the song was originally composed to commemorate a particular storm-the great
hurricane of San Felipe that diagonally traversed Puerto Rico on
September 13, 1928. Hurricanes are no novelty to the islanders,
but the Eury of that one was memorable. No one who lived through
it forgot it. Don Victor Jordiin, my father-in-law, who was about
eight at the time living with his family in the highlands of Utuado,
remembers the force of the wind, the howling noise, and the terror
of a sky filled with flying zinc roofs as the houses were stripped and
demolished. Winds reached 150 mph, the strongest ever recorded
Stuart B. Schwartz is the George Burton Adarns Professor of History at Yale
University. A version of this essay was presented as the keynote address at "Winds
of Change: Environmental, Political, Social, and Cultural Forces in the Shaping of
the Atlantic World,"the Third Biennial Allen Morris Conference on the History of
Florida and the Atlantic World in Tallahassee in February 2004.
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on the island. Property damage was in the millions, and over three
hundred people officially (perhaps as many as ffiteen hundred in
reality) lost their lives as a direct result of the storm; the number, in
fact, kept relatively low because of the lessons learned and precautions taken after the San Ciriaco hurricane of 1899 that had killed
over three thousand on the island. The island's coffee crop was
almost lost in its entirety, and thereafter Puerto Rico never
regained its position as a coffee exporter. The island had been devastated. No better icon of the storm exists than the image of a palm
tree in Utuado transfured by a wood plank driven by the force of the
wind to form a cross, symbolic of the island's Calvary.
But the great storm was not done. It had already run its deadly course respecting no cultural or political frontiers. Hurricanes
never do. Before it crossed Puerto Rico, the storm had battered the
British West Indian island of Dominica and French-speaking
Guadeloupe and then had followed a northwestern track ripping
into the Virgin Islands and leaving devastation and death in its
wake. Now, after traversing Puerto Rico, it headed northward passing over the Bahamas, and then slammed into West Palm Beach on
September 16, 1928. Then it moved west and north, skirting the
glades and passing over Lake Okeechobee, where thousands of
Bahamian migrant laborers who had been brought in to work the
new fields perished in the rising waters and bursting dikes.' It then
turned northward toward New England. The impact of the storm,
what kind of "natural disaster" it was, differed according to the
social and political arrangements that had preexisted it and those
that followed it. The storm brought, or had created, challenges and
opportunities, but these had varied along its path.
Empires, nations, and people in the Circum-Caribbean created
historical realities and cultural differences that have served as the
basic markers for understanding and interpreting the region, but
the San Felipe storm, like others of its type, demonstrated an
underlying environmental unity that also provides a central thread
or means to understanding a Caribbean past too often viewed in
terms of its insularity. The storms marked the importance of region
in a historiography of places.' The same storm produced a dif1.

2.

See, for example, Laurent Farrugia, " 1928-Le cyclone,"L 'Historial Antillais 5
(ca. 1980): 155-66; Eliot Kleinberg, Black Cloud: The Great Floridd Hum'cane of
1928 (New York, 2003).
Bonham C. Richardson, Economy and Environment in the Caribbean (Gainemille,
Fla., 1997)' 213.
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An icon of the San Felipe hurricane of 1928. From Ivan Ray Tannehill, Hurricanes
(Princeton, N.J., 1938).
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ferential impact on the societies that it crossed, and within those
societies, its effects were suffered differentially by different groups
and interests. It is by looking both comparatively across imperial
and national frontiers and internally across social and ethnic
boundaries that the impact of the hurricanes is best understood.
This essay suggests some of the themes and approaches that a
history of hurricanes provides for the study of Circum-Caribbean
societies and how the storms themselves defined the region. Other
themes or meta-narratives-notably imperialism, slavery, plantation
economies, and the heritage of race-have also been used at various times as kt motvs of Caribbean history, and justly so. I am not
aiming to replace them, but simply suggest that the great storms
may provide another tool for understanding the societies of the
region, and that like slavery or imperialism, the hurricanes have
been a determining force in the patterns of the region's history. My
intention is to iden* the paths of investigation already traveled
and to suggest others that might be able to respond to historical
questions and concerns of the present century. Of course, the phenomenon of the Atlantic hurricanes goes far beyond the bounds of
the Caribbean. After traversing Florida, the San Felipe storm itself
finally reached Canada and faded from memory somewhere in the
North Atlantic. Hurricanes are, of course, not limited to the
Circum- Caribbean , but they are, by their frequency, elements that
do characterize that region, and they have shaped its societies and
histories and even its other meta-narratives in many ways. How to
tell the story of the storms, how it has been told, and with what questions we might frame that story in the future is what I would like to
bring to your attention.
In what was arguably the most important work of history of the
twentieth century, French scholar Fernand Braudel departed from
the usual focus on the political events of a national or regional history to show us how we might conceive of a broader history in which
the structures and patterns of life, often barely perceptible, lay
beneath the events that had usually preoccupied historians.
Braudel chose as the scenario of his work the Mediterranean Sea,
its islands, and the land masses that defined it-the peninsulas, the
mountain ranges, and the coasts that gave the sea its shape, and
whose ports gave it meaning. By disregarding the division of that
sea into Muslim and Christian spheres, or into areas of national or
cultural boundaries, Braudel sought first to find the key elements
that defined the whole area and that often resulted in shared
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol83/iss4/3
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behaviors, actions, and beliefs that transcended national, religious,
or other cultural divides. Clearly environment or, as he called it,
climate set the parameters of cultural and political action in that
ancient sea where bread, olives, and the vine had created a shared
civilization that crossed cultural divides of many kinds.3
There are few places better suited to Braudel's classic approach
than the Circum-Caribbean region, and fewer still that could profit more from a fresh approach in which the classic linguistic or cultural boundaries that have created separated peoples and separate
historiographies might be overcome. Hundreds of islands in a
chain extending over four thousand kilometers; the coastal regions
of two continents and, as Pablo Neruda called it, "the sweet waist of
America" that is Central America; territories divided linguistically
into Anglophone, Francophone, Hispanic, and other societies
divided geographically into continental and insular histories: the
reasons for separate treatment are many, but at the same time, the
commonalities that characterize the region are all too clear.
Similar vegetation, similar landscapes, similar rhythms of life, and
similar products have made the Caribbean societies sisters of experience and also sibling rivals for survival. All of them have in some
way or to some degree experienced European colonization,
destruction of the indigenous populations, African slavery, plantation regimes, multiracial societies, waves of African, Asian, and
European immigrants, the legacies of race, the struggle for independence, experiments with political forms, and a search for viable
political and economic solutions, sometimes resulting in this postmodern age in the surreal solutions of offshore banking and sexual tourism. And, the entire region has confronted the common
challenges of environment.
Those challenges included all of the major types of natural
hazards. Much of the region is volcanic and has in historical times
been subjected to volcanic eruptions and earthquakes of major
proportions. One need only think of the seismic destruction in
3.

4.

Fernand Braudel, La Me'ditnmwk d L monh miditeranken 8 la t@qw & Philippe
143 vols. (1949; reprint, Paris, France, 1990).
For example, on the impact of hurricanes on Yucatan, see Herman W.
Konrad, 'Caribbean Tropical Storms: Ecological Implications for PreHispanic and Contemporary Maya Subsistence on the Yucatan Peninsula,"
Rmista & la Unkversidad Autdnoma de Yucatan 18 (2003): 94126; Virginia
Garcia Acosta, "Huracanesy/o desastres en Yucadn,"Reuista & la Univmidad
Autdnoma de Yucatan 17 (2002) : 3-15.
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1697 of Port Royal,Jamaica, or the volcanic eruptions like that of
Mount Pelie that killed over thirty thousand inhabitants of
Martinique in 1902 or of Mt. Soufriere on St. Vincent in 1979.
Droughts are all too frequent in the region, and for much of its
history, disease was by far the greatest cause of death in the
Circum-Caribbean, decimating first the indigenous populations,
exacting a morbid tribute from the African forced laborers, and
simply killing at a rapid rate (about four times that of Africans)
the Europeans who first crossed into that environment. But of all
the hazards that humans confront in the region, none is more
characteristic than the great Caribbean hurricanes that have
defined the region and its risks.
And the different hazards are not unrelated. In fact, as early as
the sixteenth century, European observers, colonial administrators,
and local residents began to remark on the hurricanes and the
resulting droughts or disease, or the hurricanes' simultaneous
occurrence with seismic activity. That is, the great storms were seen
not only as destructive forces in themselves but also as the triggers
of other catastrophes. Of course, eighteenthcentury observers did
not yet understand that the droughts following a period of
increased hurricane activity were typical of a La Niiia event, but
there was a realization that the destruction of crops and shelter
could weaken populations and make them more susceptible to
other threats. Governor Richard Fitzwilliam wrote from the
Bahamas in 1733 that the July hurricane of that year had destroyed
all "the corn and fruits of this Island, which has made all sorts of
provisions much scarcer than usual, and this scarcity, I imagine, has
occasioned a sickness that has carried off a great number of inhab
it ant^."^ Governors from Jamaica, Antigua, and Nevis often wrote
in a similar vein, linking in their correspondence what.was already
joined in common perception, the union of misfortunes of hurricanes, shortages, droughts, and sickness to which were often coupled the destruction and losses occasioned by war-that other
constant danger and characteristic condition of the Caribbean for
much of its history.
When we look at natural disasters in contemporary times,
there are a couple of points that need to be made at the outset.
5.

Governor Richard Fitzwilliarn to Duke of Newcastle, 4 December 1733, in
Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers: America and the West Indies
(London, 1860-),Colonial Series #40 n. 423,247.
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The first is one that has now become almost a battle cry: hurricanes are natural phenomena, but they are not natural disasters.
A tropical storm that passes over an uninhabited island is a natural phenomenon, but it is only when it encounters dense concentrations of people or property that it becomes a catastrophe. The
location of populations, the development of beach front homes
and hotels, the failure to impose proper building codes: all have
contributed to increasing the destructiveness of the Caribbean
storms. We confront a seeming anomaly. Despite technological
and scientific advances in prediction, there has been, in fact, a
considerable increase in the destructive effects of natural disasters
since 1960. The average annual mortality due to disasters
increased from 23,000 per year to 143,000 between the 1960s and
19'70s, but property damage has increased even more. The
Southeast Asian Tsunami of 2004 underlined the fact that, in
human terms if not in property value, by far the worst sufferers of
the effects of "climatic" disasters have been poor people and poor
countries. In the contemporary world, "natural disasters" like
humcanes have been socially selective, and they have probably
been so in the past.
What the effects of their differential impact may have been on
political movements or social groupings remains to be studied. It is
here that I think much can be done to write a social, cultural, and
economic history of the storms. How did the hurricanes and other
natural disasters shape politics and social relations, and how did
political and social structures create the contexts for the impact of
those phenomena? How did explanations of the storms and understanding them reflect changing conceptualizations of God, Nature,
Science, and human abilities? Then too, there is yet another level
of analysis that awaits attention. What has been the long-term
cumulative effect of repeated natural disasters on the region? To
what extent have the storms contributed to the regional problems
of growth or development? Such issues have never been calculated
or estimated the way in which economist Eric Jones sought to do in
his attempt to explain Europe's economic advantage over Asia.
Whatever the short-comings or implicit Eurocentrism of The
European Miracle (1981), he at least sought to make comparative
environmental conditions and their cumulative effects part of a
larger economic history of regional development and the interaction of cultural attitudes and technology. The Caribbean might
lend itself particularly well to such an analysis, although informaPublished by STARS, 2004
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tion is spotty and the formula for calculation will be extremely complex.6
The writing of the history of hurricanes like that of much environmental history begins with a problem. For all their power and
destructive potential, the histoxy of the hurricanes is, because of
their frequency, almost inherently boring. Unlike volcanoes or
earthquakes, the great storms are somewhat dependable. Almost
every year some island or coast is inundated or devastated. While
for individual islands or cities or stretches of shoreline, hurricanes
may be spaced decades apart, in a regional sense, the phenomenon
is repetitious and the results expected. The scenes of destruction
are all too common and all too similar: shattered homes and shattered lives, boats piled up on the beaches or carried far inland,
destruction in all directions, posterior scenes of relief and aid
amidst a backdrop of ruin. The individual stories may be poignant,
but their repetition is numbing. Accounts seem to vary only in the
level of destruction, the amount of loss, or the level of the force of
the winds. If the story to be told is only that of the storms themselves, then the repetitiveness is inherent. The variations from one
storm to the next may be interesting from a meteorological perspective, but have less significance from a historical one. Moreover,
as acts of nature or the handiwork of God, the hurricanes are
beyond human control and are therefore outside of history, that
helps to explain why they have been ignored as a theme in themselves. They are the classic deus ex machina that as historians and
social scientists we are admonished to avoid like the plague. But, at
the same time, because of their ubiquity and regularity, we can also
fall into the opposite error of seeing them as the explanation of
everything. Almost every regional event, battle, revolt, revolution,
or election has been preceded by one or several hurricanes. To
find the balance between explaining too much or too little in the
history of the hurricanes, or in any environmental history, is a tricky
business at best.
Hurricanes have certainly generated interest. I see the existing literature groups in four large categories. First there are the
sociological studies, which are organized around themes of risk
6.

Eric Jones, The European Miracle, 3rd ed. (Cambridge,Eng., 2003). Examples
of the historicization of disasters are the essays in Alessa Johns, ~ f u
Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of the Enlightenment (New
York, 1999).
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management and coping. Since Pritimkin Sorokin wrote his classic Man and Society in Calamity (1942), social scientists have studied
the way in which individuals respond socially and psychologically
to disasters, or why they continue to act in ways that make them
vulnerable. The islanders may know that the volcano is liable to
erupt, but they also know that the mountain sides have the most
fertile soils. Building on the shoreline makes property more prone
to hurricane damage and subject to higher insurance rates, but
people like the beach. Individuals and communities have to balance the risks against the benefits, and the study of how and why
they do that has long been a classic field of research in sociology.
In the hands of a master like Kai Erickson, in a book like Everything
in its Path (1976), the analysis of a single community's response
can provide material for a narrative of powerful analysis. Most of
this work is based on interviews or direct observation and often has
little historical depth, and it rarely addresses long-term economic
or political effects, but that has been changing. Ted Steinberg's
Acts of Cod (2000) has taken a hard look at how our decisions and
policies have made disasters.'
A second large category of publications has been generated by
governmental relief agencies, NGOs, or those who study them.
How best to respond to a natural disaster, what should be the goals
of relief, who best to receive it, and in what form? These are the
questions that orient a whole industry of publication designed with
a pragmatic intent. This literature poses practical questions: Let
people stay in place or build tent cities? Give out food or seeds to
plant? Favor those with capital to rebuild, or those most at risk?
UNICEF, the Red Cross, and other agencies have invested great
effort in analyzing and in theorizing about these issues. This carpus tends to be highly technical, problem-oriented, and often relatively averse to making cultural differences and historical
experiences or contexts factors in the solutions suggested.
A third category of literature is essentially climatological or
meteorological. Its goals have been purely scientific knowledge
but are also written with a hope that these studies will lead to better efforts at prediction of the storms, or at least of being able to
provide advice on the best strategies to avoid human disasters. Of
7.

Kai T. Erickson, Everything in its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo
Creek Flood (NewYork, 1976);Ted Steinberg,Acts of God: 77w Unnatural Histmy
of Naturnl Disaster in America (Oxford, Eng., 2000).
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course, the history of meteorology and of storm prediction has
become a subfield within this literature.* In the nineteenth century, the story of the definition of the storms and the understanding of their nature-in short, the development of meteorology as
a science-was particularly important. More recently, this historiography has broadened to encompass cultural and social understandings and uses of ~ c i e n ~
knowledge.
c
Themes like the
historical impact of technology on prediction, from the barometer to the telegraph to satellite observation, or the bureaucratization of prediction in the creation of weather services, or the
creation and politicization of relief agencies have become central
features of the study of the hurricanes. Beneath all of these is a
history of mentalities that reveals changing attitudes toward God
and Nature exposed by reactions to the storms or attempts to
manage them.
The fourth category of historical study of the storms has
remained relatively underdeveloped. Curiously, historians and
especially social historians have not given much attention to the
Caribbean hurricanes. The classic form of the historiography of
hurricanes began with, and remains to some extent, chronologies:
whether by year of the storms, where and when they passed, and
how much loss of life or property, lists have been compiled in some
numbers. In the mid-nineteenth century, the young Cuban Andrks
Poey, member of a distinguished family of intellectuals,spent much
of his early life in the National Library of Paris compiling a chronology and bibliography of works related to the Caribbean hurricanes.
His published record included 400 storms and 450 authors up to
1855.~Poey's broad regional approach was followed a century later
by another Cuban, Jose Carlos Millh, who published a detailed
chronology up to 1968. Most of the larger islands of the region and
many areas have found a historian who has painstakingly compiled
a list of the storms and has gathered information on their effects so
that now one can turn to Rodriguez-Ramirez (1956) for Cuba, or
for Puerto Rico to Rafael Ramirez de Arellano (1932) or Luis
Salivia (1967), or for the United States to weather historian David

8.
9.

Bob Sheets and Jack Williams, Hurricane Watch (NewYork, 2001).
The Andrks Poey papers are housed at the Museu Montank in the Faculty of
Biology at the Universidad de La Habana, Cuba. To date, they have not
received scholarly attention.
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Ludlum's wonderfully researched Early A-can
Hunicanes that carried the listing up to 1870.1°
These studies are invaluable for the information they contain
and the sources they have revealed, but the organizing principles
and the central questions of the chronologists did not usually c a p
ture the dynamic relationship between the storms and other aspects
of social and political life, and they rarely note the way in which the
disasters are produced by societies. Only recently has that been
changing, and whether in the area of cultural understandings
where Peter Hulme's work has been foundational, in the interweaving of biography and hurricane history such as Erik Larson's
account of the Galveston storm of 1900, in the recent development
of social and economic studies as represented by Louis Perez's
recent book on Cuba, or by the recent scholarship of Matthew
Mulcahy and SherryJohnson, it is apparent that a new appreciation
of the relationship between society, culture, and environment has
opened up a broad range of opportunities.11
Above all remains the question of the potential impact of hurricanes on the social and economic development of CircumCaribbean societies. The indigenous inhabitants of the region
recognized the power of the great storms, and they knew the signs
of their approach. They offered cassava to their m i s to spare them
10. M.E. Rodriguez-Ramirez, "Cronologia clasificada de 10s cyclones que han azotado a la isla de Cuba desde 1800 hasta 1956," Revista Cdana h Meterologia
(Havana) 2 (1956); Luis A. Salivia, Hish los taporales de Puerto Rico y las
Antilh (SanJuan, P.R, 1972);David Ludlum, Early American Hurricanes, 14921870 (Boston, 1963). On Florida, see Jay Barnes, h d a ' s Hurricane History
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998). See also the classic Ivan Ray Tannehill, Hunicanes
(Princeton, N.J., 1942).
11. Peter Hulme, Cohial Encountm: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797
(London, Eng., 1986); Louis A. Pirez Jr., Winds of Change: Hurricanes and the
Transfmtion of Nineteenth-Catuq Cuba (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001) ; Erik
Larson, Isaac's S t m (New York, 1999); Matthew Mulcahy, "Urban Disasters
and Imperial Relief in the British-Atlantic World, 1740-1780," in States of
Emergency: Coping with Emergency in European History, ed. Genevieve Massard
Guilbaud, et. al. (New York, 2002); idem, "A Tempestuous Spirit called
Hurricano: Hurricanes and Colonial Society in the British Greater
Caribbean," in Ammican Disastm, ed. Steven Biel (New York, 2001); idem,
"'Melancholy and Fatal Calamities': Disasters and Society in EighteenthCentury South Carolina," in Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial
South Carolina S Plantation Society, ed. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary BranaShute,
and Randy Sparks (Columbia, S.C., 2001); Sheny Johnson, "El Nifio and
Environmental Crisis: Reinterpreting American Rebellions in the 1790s,"
paper presented to the Allen Morris Conference on the History of Florida
and the Atlantic World, Tallahassee, Fla., 2003.
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from their greatest dangers: fire, sickness, their Carib enemies,
and the hurricanes.12 Curiously the Taino symbol for the storms
with its curving outstretched arms seems to recognize the rotating
nature of the winds, a fact that Western science did not really estab
lish until the publication of William Reid's The Law of S t m (1838).
In 1550, a residmcia (judicial investigation) of the governor of
Puerto Rico revealed that he had ordered an Indian punished for
sorcery for predicting when the storms would come.15 "The
Indians are so skillful that they know two or three or four days
beforehand of the coming of it," wrote John Taylor in his New and
St. Crist@hers, of a tnnpestuow Spirt which is called by
Strange News*
twndians a Hurricane (1638).14 Before the development of the
barometer in the seventeenth century and later scientific means of
prediction, the ability to read the signs of a hurricane's approach
became a matter of life and death. The indigenous peoples knew
the signs of the storm's approach. But the skill at reading these
signs could also be turned against the native peoples. In his 1'788
account of Puerto Rico, Father Ifiigo Abad y Lasierra noted the
Indians had read certain signs as forewarnings of a hurricane's
approach: a red sun, a strong odor from the sea, the rapid change
of the breeze from east to west. Carib powers of observation and
prediction of the storms were used as evidence of their pact with
the devil and reason for their expulsion. As the Europeans eliminated the indigenous populations, they likewise increased their
own vulnerability. On St. Christopher, after the Caribs had been
removed from the island, colonists had to send to neighboring
Dominica for weather reports.15 Even today, on every island there
exists a popular wisdom or recognition of "signs" that supposedly
tell of the approach of the hurricanes. Whether this is a particularly
good harvest of avocadoes as on Puerto Rico or the roosting of
chickens on the island of Nevis, such signs are still given credence
12. Michael Craton, Histmy of the Bahamas (Waterloo, Ont., 1986), 27,
13. Francisco Moscoso, Juicio al Gobernador. Episodios coloniales cke Puerto Rico, 1550
(SanJuan, P.R., 1998), 134.
14. Taylor's work is cited and discussed in Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters, 100101. See also, idem, "Hurricanesin the Caribbees: The Constitution of the
Discourse of English Colonialism," in 1642: Literature and Power in the
Sewteenth Centuy, ed. Francis Barker,Jay Bernstein, et. al., (Colchester,Eng.,
1981), 55-83.
15. Iiiigo Abbad y Lasierra, Historia geografica, civil y natural de la isla & SunJuan
Bautista & Pun-to Rico, ed. Josk J u l i h de Acosta y Calvo and Gervasio Garcia
(SanJuan, P.R., 2002), 530.
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along with the modern predictors of barometer readings, aerial
photographs, and computer simulations.
From the very beginning of European contact, the hurricanes
shaped the settlement of the region and the patterns of established
life. Columbus enjoyed incredible luck when, in 1492, he sailed
right across the latitudes of greatest hurricane activity at the height
of the season in September and October without encountering a
storm. Later, he came to know them well. He may have experienced his first hurricane inJune 1494 during his second voyage, but
in 1502, he was able to ride out a storm off Hispaniola when over
twenty Spanish ships and five hundred men went down because his
rival, the royal governor Francisco de Bobadilla, had spurned
Columbus's warnings that the high cirrus clouds and southeasterly
swell signaled the approach of an oncoming storm. That storm leveled the city of Santo Domingo. It was, said Father Bartolome de
las b a s , "as if an army of demons had escaped from Hell"16 The
ship carrying Columbus's personal fortune miraculously escaped,
and there were those at the time who accused him of not having
predicted the storm but of having used magical powers to call it
down on the governor.
Clearly, God or the devil was thought to be much involved in
these matters. Chronicler Gonzalo Ferngndez de Oviedo noted
after Santo Domingo had been struck by hurricanes in 1504,1508,
and 1509 that the sacrament had been placed in the churches and
monasteries of the town, and that after this was done, the storms
had ceased.17 Throughout the region, the losses and deaths caused
by the storms were interpreted as the hand of God in the affairs of
men. In the aftermath of a great storm on St. Croix in 1772,
Presbyterian minister Hugh Knox wrote that the Lord of Hosts,
"who commandeth and raiseth a storm, and who again maketh the
storm a calm; who is the sovereign Lord of universal nature; who
exercises an absolute dominion over all the elements of this lower
world, and employs them for mercy or judgment, as seemeth best
unto him," was calling the "inhabitants of this and neighboring
islands, to weeping and to mourning, to the most speedy and effectual review of their ways."18 But God's message was not always clear.
16. Josi Carlos Mill&, Huniaz?aesofthe Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (Miami, Fla.,
1968).
1 . Antonello Gerbi, Natum in the N m WwEd (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1985), 251.
18. Hugh Knox,Discourse delivered on the 6th of September, 1772 in the Duteh Church
of St. Cmix on Occasion ofthe Humicane ( S t . Croix, V.I., 1772), 16-18.
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In August of 1899, after the Spanish American War when Puerto
Rico was still under U.S. occupation, the island was struck by the
devastating hurricane of San Ciriaco. Over three thousand people
perished. Cuban nationalists saw this as the just wrath of Cbd
against the continued U.S. presence on the neighboring island.
The proSpanish dean of the diocese of Puerto Rico, Juan Perpiiia
y Pibernat, believed instead that it was the islanders' sinful secularism and the abandonment of their Hispanic traditions that had
called forth this punishment. That the storm was a divine object
lesson had been generally agreed upon, but the intended recipients of the lesson remained a matter of some dispute. Even as scientific explanations of weather have come to dominate our
interpretations, explanations of the apocalyptic or divine nature of
the storms have persisted.1g
The Spaniards had come to know the storms, their dangers,
and their rhythms quite well. A large hurricane that struck
Crooked Island in the Bahamas in 1500 and destroyed some
Spanish vessels was probably the first recorded hurricane to have
hit Florida. Large hurricanes struck Santo Domingo in 1508,1509,
and 1526, Puerto Rico in 1508, 1514,1515, and 1526, and Cuba in
1503, 1519, 1525, and 1527. We know Florida was struck in 1528
near Apalachee Bay and then again in 1545,1551,1553,1554, and
1559 at various places on the peninsula. Most historians know the
tragic tale of the hurricane of 1565 that destroyed the French effort
to forhfy the outpost at Fort Caroline and sealed the fate of Florida
as a Spanish colony.2oThrough all this, Spanish seamen and statesmen were learning the possibilities and hazards of the region. The
hurricanes were imposing themselves on the process of colonization and on the way in which the Spaniards thought of their relationship to God, Nature, and the land and the sea.
There is no better evidence of the great storms' effects than the
Spanish maritime commercial system, the camera de indias, whose patterns, rhythm, and form were all pegged to the seasonality of the hurricanes. First, the Spanish had discovered quite early that arriving in
the Caribbean was far easier than returning to Europe, and that in
order to take advantage of the prevailing winds and currents it was
19. Marti Gilabert6 Vilagran, "Tempestadesy conjuros de las fuenas naturals.
Aspectos magico-religiosos de la cultura en la alta edad moderns," Pedralbes.
Reulta d'hltmia m h 9 (1989): 19399.
20. John T. McGrath, The French in Early Flwida: In the Eye of the Hurricane
(Gainesville, Fla., 2000).
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necessary to beat to the north before crossing the Atlantic. Thus the
key to the maritime system was the Florida channel, the ninety miles
between Cuba and Florida that was the best exit from the Caribbean.
That fact had much to do with the development of Havana on
Cuba's northern shore, a location that was selected after earlier settlements had proven too vulnerable to the hurricanes. Havana was
created to function as the cornerstone of the system of fleets, a
haven and a staging area where ships gathered to make the return
voyage to Europe. Once Mexico and Peru were producing silver
and gold, the system of fleets or convoys was put into place. One
fleet left Seville in May and headed for Vera Cruz while a second
fleet, the so-called galkones, made for Panama where it traded for
Peruvian silver. The plan was for the two fleets to converge on
Havana in the spring and to exit the Caribbean by June or July,
heading toward the keys to catch the Gulf Stream northward until
around the Carolinas they would head eastward on the winds of the
While punctuality put Spanish ships at risk from
middle latit~des.~'
the pirates, privateers, and foreign navies that knew exactly where
and more or less when the fleets would sail, failure to keep to the
schedule placed them in danger from the great tropical storms.
Delays were disastrous, as the wrecks off the Bahamas and the
Florida Keys make abundantly clear. The whole structure of the system and its timing had been organized to avoid disruption by the
storms, and when schedules were upset, mariners, passengers, and
kings all paid dearly. The loss of Spanish treasure ships or silver
fleets in
1623, 1624, 1631, and 1715 (to note just a few of the
major sinkings) were disastrous to Spain's military and political
ambitions. The loss of three gaUeonas with 1.5 million pesos from
the New Spain fleet in 1622, a similar loss in 1624, and the sinking
of almost the whole silver fleet during a hurricane in 1623 came at
a crucial juncture in Spain's struggle against the Dutch, and deep
ened the financial crisis caused by a general Atlantic economic crisis between 1619 and 1621. Such losses almost always created
uncertainties of policy. When the almiranta (flagship) of the New
Spain fleet, delayed in its sailing from Vera Cruz, went down with
all its silver in a hurricane off Campeche in 1631, the Spanish valido Count Duke of Olivares recognized that he could not pay for the
political projects he had envisioned.**
21. Sheets and Williams, Hurricane Watch, 9.
22. Dominguez Ortiz, Politica J hacienda & Felipe N (Madrid, Spain, 1960).
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Spain's rivals in the Caribbean learned how to take advantage
of Spanish attempts to regularize settlement and commerce in the
face of the storms, but they also learned themselves of the signs of
approaching storms, the building techniques best able to withstand
them, and the places that offered most shelter. The Governor of
the Leeward Islands reported on reconstruction after a hurricane
of 16'75: the new houses being built were no higher than a story and
a half, 'hurricanes having taught the people to build low."23 But he
also could not convey his report to London with dispatch because
"the hurricane time hinders the correspondence of the islands."24
The storms created the natural division of seasons and time
and helped to mark memory and the pace of life. On the Spanish
islands, a special prayer against storms was recited during the hurricane season. In 1722, the Jamaica Assembly passed a special act
establishing a perpetual anniversary fast on the 28th of August to
commemorate the hurricane of that year.25 Around 1765,
Alejandro O'Riley, the reforming Bourbon governor of Puerto Rico
noted that the islanders "mark their epochs by governors, hurricanes, the visits of bishops, the arrival of the fleets or the subsidies
( sitwulos) ."26
Sadly, all the colonial powers also learned that, in the age
before accurate prediction, there was little that could be done to
avoid the force of the storms or their effects on commerce and war.
Over and over again, military and naval campaigns were thwarted
or disrupted by the storms, or defenses and fortifications were
weakened or destroyed by them, or conditions were created that
made populations either restive under authority or vulnerable to
attack. The examples are many. A French fleet was battered in
1680 off Santo Domingo with a loss of twenty-five vessels. In 1640,
thirty-six Dutch ships attacked Matanzas, Cuba, but were scattered
by a hurricane which disrupted their attack. The great hurricane
of 1780 brought havoc to both the British and French fleets when
the French lost forty ships with over four thousand troops near
23. Governor William Stapleton to unknown, 22 November 1676, in Calendar of
State Papers, Colonial Series #9 n. 1152, 499,501.
24. Governor William Stapleton to Sir Robert Southwill, 20 June 1676, C a h d m of
State Pa@, Colonial Series #9 n. 955,410.
25. Governor Nicholas Lawes to Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 December
1722, in Caladar of State Papers, Colonial Series #33 n. 382, 184.
26. Angel Gpez Cantos, Los puert-dos:
mentalidad y actitudRF (SanJuan, P.R,
2001), 47.
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Martinique, and the British shipping and men-of-war at St. Lucia
and at Barbados were sunk or grounded with great loss of life. That
same storm caught the Spanish fleet on its way to recapture
Pensacola and dispersed it with a loss of nineteen of its fifty-eight
vessels.*' The hurricanes introduced the element of chance and
accident into regional military campaigns. They patterned the way
in which war was conducted, and they made outcomes always less
secure then they might have been.
In times of war and peace, the hurricanes also created a panCaribbean community of shared risk and shared information.
Notices and warnings were sent from island to island, sometimes
even when imperial hostilities dictated against such cooperation.
Here, national and cultural differences could intervene. In 1900,
the tragic bureaucratic rivalry between U.S. Weather Service officers and their Cuban counterparts impeded receipt of telegraph
warnings sent from the negoczado del tiempo, the Cuban Weather
Service that had been created by SpanishJesuit Benito Vifies (probably the best hurricane scholar of his day). This directly contributed to the enormous loss of life when that storm struck
Galve~ton.~~
But such errors were not usual. Information, relief,
and aid were sometimes sent from one Caribbean society to another, sometimes motivated by altruism and sometimes by hopes for
political or economic advantage. In 1668, the governor, council,
and assembly of Nevis reported that the island had received so
many refugees from other islands as the result of hostilities that,
when struck by a hurricane in that year, they were left without provisions. They asked to be allowed to trade with strangers, a request
that underlined two recurrent themes: the role of the hurricanes
and other "natural disasters" in setting Caribbean populations into
motion; and the use of the hurricanes as justification by local societies to circumvent imperial restrictions. As early as 1546, the cabi&
do (town council) of Santo Domingo complained that hurricanes
and storms threatened the total depopulation of the island as mer27. Rekcibn verdadera a que se db V t a &l horribte huracan que sobreuino a la ish y
Puerlo & Santo Domingo (Madrid, Spain, 1680); M. Fowler, A gmeral account of
the calamities occasioned by the Late TrenrerulozrsHurricanes and Ea7thquakes in the
West Indian Islands (London, Eng., 1781); Robert S. Weddle, Spanish Sea: The
Gulf of Mexico in Nwth American D i s c w q (College Station, Texas, 1985), 315.
28. Larson, Isaac's Storm, 102-104. On Viiies, see "Mercedes Valero G o d e z : El
observatorio del Colegio de Belen en el siglo xix," in Anuario: Centro de
ELFtzrdws & Historia y Organizuch de la Ciencia (Havana, Cuba, 1988), 204-47.
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chants, royal officials, and even stable married settlers were leaving
the island.29 This was a theme repeated across imperial boundaries
for the next four centuries. Usually, it was the weaker and less fortunate who moved.
Those who remained faced other problems. For planters
and small farmers, the destruction of crops, the loss of cargoes
and of income were constant and immediate results, but no less
important were rising rates of insurance or costs of acquiring the
credit or capital to rebuild, replenish slaves forces, or replant
fields. The implications of such disruptions were felt in the credit markets of London and Amsterdam where bankruptcies and
failures often followed a bad hurricane season. But they also
weighed heavily on the individual islands where small planters
and those less well-connected were driven from husbandry or
even from the island itself. The storms thus had an effect of
intensifying social inequalities and patterns of social and economic dominance. In some cases, the effects were long-term
transformations. Louis Perez in his Winds of Change has shown
how the three hurricanes of the mid-1840s in Cuba resulted in a
shift of capital and labor out of the hard-hit coffee estates of
Western Cuba to the expanding sugar sector of the island. The
cafetah and their shade trees just took too long to recover to
allow planters the luxury of differing income until their farms
could again produce. A similar chain of events eliminated
Puerto Rican coffee from the export market after the San Felipe
storm of 1928. There was a certain irony in the role of hurricanes
in the destruction of coffee economies since it was supposedly in
1'720, after a hurricane had destroyed cacao cultivation in
Martinique, that the French had introduced coffee into their
Caribbean colonies from whence it spread to the Spanish islands.
The great storms served to structure societies, and for much of
the Caribbean's history this implied an impact on the region's principal institutions of slavery and agriculture, often plantation agriculture. The usual insecurities of slave societies could be
aggravated by the disruption and destruction of the storms.
Governor Francis Russell wrote from Barbados following the hurricane of 1694 that he had ordered houses to put out their lights and
constables to remain on watch "lest the negros should take advan29. Genaro Rodriguez Morel, ed., Cartas del cabaldo & la ciudad de Santo Domingo
m el si& mi (Santo Domingo, D.R., 1999), 172-73.
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tage of the disorder to rise."% That more insurrections did not follow the storms may be due to the heightened watcblness of
planters and colonial officers, and the use of colonial militias in the
immediate aftermath of a hurricane, but it may also be that slaves
especially suffered in the great storms.
Due to the precariousness of their living conditions and their
low status, slaves remained at greatest risk. Food shortages and die
ease in the wake of the hurricanes tended to affect them disproportionately. That condition could have an unexpected outcome.
It has been suggested that during the debates on amelioration of
slavery in Parliament in the 1'780s and 1'790s, the commission
charged with inquily into the conditions of West Indian slaves
observed a situation that reflected the abysmal conditions on the
islands following the great hurricanes of 1'780-81, and thus drew
conclusions about the situation of slaves that were, in fact, conjunctural not structural, leading them to advocate better conditions for the slaves. Of course, as in any circumstance, individuals
could make the best of a bad situation. The storms created opportunities for slaves. In Puerto Rico, after the San Narciso hurricane
of 1867, for example,Juan Quifiones, a slave who had been impris
oned in Guarabo, escaped his confinement. Instead of fleeing, he
joined the effort to rescue victims of the storm. The Sociedad de
Arnigos del Pais later recognized his sacrifice by purchasing his
freedom .3
But if the great storms sometimes moved populations, altered
or reinforced social relations, or determined the outcome of international rivalries, they were equally important in structuring relationships of authority and power within Caribbean communities.
The hurricanes and their effectsoften became points of complaint
and vehicles by which colonial interests or local authorities could
make their situations known to the metropolis or the national government, allowing them opportunities to drive home requests for
attention and aid. Some examples from the English islands will
make the point. After Barbados suffered hurricanes in both 1674
and 16'75, its governor described the ruin of houses, churches,
mills, and cane fields in his request for aid, although he stated that
-

30. Governor Francis Russell to unknown, 24 October 1694, in Caleradar of State
Papers, Colonial Series #14 n. 1446, 385.
31. Ramirez de Arellano, "Los huracanes de Puerto Rico," Bolelin ak la
Universidad & Puerto Rtco, 3d ser., 2 (1932): 7-75.
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not even £200,000 could repay the damage.32 Other letters followed in which the colonists called for the government to send
them pikes and small arms since the hurricane had left the island
defenseless. 33 A report from St. Christopher in that year noted that
the people on the island had been quite "undone" by both the hurricane and the French, and if they could, all would move to
Jamaica. In a similar vein, Governor Daniel Parke wrote from
Antigua in 1'707 that after losses to the French and a hurricane that
blew down most of the houses in the Windward Islands, the people
were grumbling about the quartering of soldiers."
In 1712, Governor Lord Archibald Hamilton wrote from
Jamaica to the Board of Trade listing over twenty ships recently lost
and asking for help.35 The Jamaica Assembly subsequently wrote to
the Duke of Newcastle in 1734 that "this island was never in greater
distress or had more occasion for the assistance of its Mother
Country than at this present time, occasioned by a chain of losses
and misfortunes, etc. not only by three dreadful hurricanes which
happened within the space of fourteen years, attended by long and
severe droughts; but the lowness of our produce in Great Britain,
the loss of our trade and t he heavy taxes. . . ." The Assembly pleaded for the Duke to present their plight to the King."
Colonial governors continually used the devastation of the
storms to seek help, employing the condition of the islands and the
sentiment of the inhabitants asjustifications for their governments'
concern, often combining arguments about the well being of the
colonists and the economy with the ability of the colony to withstand foreign incursion or appropriation. Governments responded
sometimes with large subsidies. The amount sent to the Caribbean
ic
of the Bn'tish West
32. Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An E c ~ ~ n nHis*
Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore, Md., 1973), 400. See especially Matthew
Mulcahy, Weathering the Storms: Hurricanes and Plantation Agriculture in
the British Greater Caribbean," typescript, 2002, in possession of the author.
33. Petition of merchants and planters of Barbados to the king, 11 May 1677, in
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series #10 n. 231,83; Memorandum, 16 May
1677, #10 n. 250,88.
34. Governor Daniel Parke to Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 October 1707,
in Cahda7 of State Papers, Colonial Series #23 n. 1321; see also Governor
Daniel Parke to Council of Trade and Plantations, 6 March 1708, in Calendar
of State Papers, Colonial Series #23 n. 1380, 689.
35. Governor Archibald Hamilton to Council of Trade and Plantations, 10
October 1712, in Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series #2'7 n. 94,61-2, 6S5.
36. Council and Assembly of Jamaica to Duke of Newcastle, 21 August 1734, in
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series #41 n. 285, 190.
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HURRICANES
401
after the great 1780 hurricane in the British West Indies was the
largest ever raised by Parliament for such ends, but until the twentieth century, relief was seen as an essentially charitable act rather
than as a function of rule or of governmental responsibility. In the
Spanish islands, the result of this pattern was the development of
responsibility and leadership in coordination of ecclesiastical and
secular efforts at the municipal level. Disaster relief was one of the
most useful activities of the alcaldes and the cabildos, and over the
course of the nineteenth centuly, it helped to promote both competence and a certain feeling of responsibility. Hurricane response
became the training-ground of local political action and s e I f - ~ ~ ciency.
In a provocative piece on the effects of hurricane Andrew, historian Raymond Arsenault has argued that only recently have natural catastrophes and the responses to them become matters of
public policy, and that prior to the late twentieth century, relief and
recovery were essentially private matter^.^' He certainly has a point
about the way in which the media has made these storms into p u b
lic events and how precision of measurement of the storms and the
losses they cause have increased in recent times and thus trans
formed responses. I would argue, however, that since the early
modem era there is considerable evidence of attempts by colonial
governments in the Caribbean to assume the burdens of relief in
the wake of the hurricanes, or for local governmental institutions to
undertake the responsibility of protection and relief. In fact, one
could argue that these efforts on a repeated, if discontinuous, basis
sometimes promoted a sense of local self-sufEciency that could have
broad political implications. Moreover, actions taken by colonial,
national, or local governments often reflected social and political
visions of what constituted proper society; how a city was rebuilt,
what neighborhoods received attention first, what kind of housing
materials were used, what kind of houses were replaced, and if
planters or peasants, entrepreneurs or workers were to benefit most
from government action turned the hurricanes into tools for structuring society as well as lenses through which society and polity
could be observed.
37. Raymond Arsenault, "The Public Storm: Hurricanes and the State in
Twentieth- Century America," in Public Life and the Historical Imagination, ed.
Wendy Gamber, Michael Grossberg, and Hendrik Hartog (South Bend, Ind.,
2003),262-92.
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But if the storms offered colonial governors and creole residents occasions to seek governmental attention, the inability of
metropolitan and later national governments to respond adequately to the storms also produced dissatisfactions with possibly serious
political implications. Here let me use the example of Puerto Rico
and Cuba. Puerto Rico had suffered a major hurricane (San
Narciso) in November 1867, followed closely by an earthquake of
some force.38 Towns could not pay their contributions to the
island's treasury, and the governor, faced with mounting expenses,
tried to force payment despite the sad conditions on the island. But
there were also Spanish officials on the island at that time who realized that the real dangers generated by the disasters were far
greater than fiscal recalcitrance or shortfalls. Puerto Rico in the
1860s was in the midst of political turmoil, and a revolutionary committee had already been formed by the time the storm had struck.
Officers like Miguel de Campos and Carlos de Rojas warned their
superiors that there was a general "ill-feeling" on the island among
the thousands of men unemployed who, without a salary as a result
of the storm, were thus "liable to perish from hunger or to succumb
to the suggestions of the disrupters of public order, or to violate the
laws that protect the rich and private property." Appeals to charity
and patriotism were not enough; the government was required to
act to maintain its reputation and the "peaceful conservation of the
regime." The colonial government had failed, said Miguel de
Campos, an officer in the Public Works department, because "people in every nation are reluctant to pay for public works unless the
benefits are tangible and immediate." Campos noted that only
about 3 percent of the island's budget had gone to public works in
the previous decade, and the results were obvious to all. Whatever
efforts had been made to improve life in the colonies were in
Puerto Rico "completely null."39 The unsuccessful insurrection of
Puerto Rico, the famous "Grito de Lares" of September 1868, of
course, had many causes, but the conditions created on the island
by the San Narciso storm and the continued inability of the Spanish
colonial government to prepare the island for such dangers by providing an adequate infrastructure,or effective response in the after38. Vicente Fontan y Mera, La ?nmwrablenoche & San Narciso y los temblors & tima
(San Juan, P.R.,1868).
39. Miguel de Campos, report, Ultramar legajo 379, exp. lo., Archivo Historico
Nacional, Madrid, Spain.
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math of disaster, contributed to sentiments of frustration that
underlay the movement.
In Cuba, hurricanes in 1882 that destroyed Vuelta-Abajo and
much of Pinar del Rio elicited calls for help and promises of aid
within the context of a politically insecure Cuba in the last
moments before its final revolutionary move toward independence.
Shortly after the storm, civic leaders wrote to individuals and institutions in Spain asking for help and reminding them that "the
island is Spain, blood of its blood, bones of its bones just as its
brothers from beyond the ocean have demonstrated so many times.
. . . Today it is our turn to ask, our turn to call on the sentiments
of Spain in individuals and corporations. Brothers: charity for
Vuelta-Abajo. Your nobility is ours as well, your charity demands it
of you. . . ." Spain responded. Queen Isabel I1 sent a telegram
promising to attempt "as far as my powers can reach to relieve such
di~asters."~~
The government in Madrid created a specialjunta that
included Cuban representatives in the Spanish legislative bodies as
well as other men experienced in colonial affairs to oversee relief to
its overseas colonies of Cuba and the Philippines, both of which
had been hit by hurricanes in 1882. But although the royal family,
the government, and the sentiments of the Spanish people had
been greatly affected by the disasters, the junta was essentially
formed to raise funds by voluntary subscription since "it was impossible for the resources of the Treasury to respond to so many
calamitie~."~~
The government organized a charity auction in
which the wealthiest citizens pledged various items, all of which
were carefully noted in the press. This kind of demonstrably inadequate traditional response revealed the failures of the colonial
regime. No wonder then that after the 1899 San Ciriaco hurricane
in Puerto Rico, the U.S. government was particularly anxious to
demonstrate not only American benevolence but also its efficiency
in the relief effort as a way of proving to the Puerto Ricans the benefits of occupation by a progressive nation. In more recent times,
hurricanes have sometimes offered governments similar opportunities. Ciudad Trujillo used his efforts to rebuild Santo Domingo
after the 1930 hurricane of San Zen4n as evidence of his concern
for the Dominican people, and the Castro regime in Cuba made
40. El huracan de Vwlta-Abajo(Havana, 1883), 13-14, 30.
41. Mem0nemOna
en qw se ah nunta & los trabajos & laJunta Gaeral de S o c m s para Cuba
y FiIifinas (Madrid, Spain, 1884).
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efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to demonstrate Socialism's managerial flexibility in its responses to
Let me finish here by returning to the San Felipe or
Okeechobee hurricane with which I began because it takes us into
the twentieth century and because, in the storm's different impacts
upon Florida and Puerto Rico, we can see how some themes treated in this essay played out. Leadership in both societies had a vision
of an ideal future, and in both places they were willing to use the
disaster as a tool to implement this vision. By 1928, the American
National Red Cross was functioning-a story in and of itself-and
its reports and efforts in both Florida and Puerto Rico provide considerable information on the impact and nature of reconstruction.
In Puerto Rico, while immediate mortality had been kept relatively low, the San Felipe storm left about a third of the 1.5 million
population homeless. Most of the $40 million in property loss had
been to privately-owned properties. There were those in the political class of the island who saw recovery as an opportunity to restructure society by creating a countxyside populated with industrious
small farmers living in neat cottages, the realization of the old rural
myth of the hardyj i b a r ~ .Natalio
~ ~ Bayonet Diaz, ex-member of the
House of Representatives, urged the governor to call on Puerto
Ricans to shoulder the burden of recovery and not depend on foreign aid. He warned that allowing rural-teurban migration had to
be prevented at all costs, and that only children and women either
tending families or unable to work should be able to receive free
food. Over 40,000 homes had to be rebuilt to house about 250,000
rural people left homeless by the storm, but that task also offered
reform opportunities. Bayonet Diaz argued that building new
orderly residences would be a necessary improvement, "solving
once and for all the problem of hygienic dwelling for our laboring
men, and causing to disappear from the countryside the wretched

42. Lauren Derby, "A City of Miracles: Urban Space, Social Disease, and the
Hurricane of San Zen6n,"unpublished manuscript, 1994, in possession of the
author.
43. Francisco Scarano, "The Jibaro Mascarade and the Subaltern Politics of
Creole Identity Formation in Puerto Rico, 17451823," American Historical
Reuieur 101 (1996): 1398-431. It should be noted that the idea of creating
small farmers who would work in tandem with the large estates and whose
investment in property would serve as a social control on disorder also characterized a report of conditions in Barbados and the Windwards after hurricanes in 1897 and 1898; see Richardson, Economy and Environment, 21 1-36.
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Track of the 1928 San Felipe hurricane. From American Red Cross, West Indies
Hurricane haster: 0-l
Report of Relief Wmk in Pmto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and
Noda (Washington, D.C., 1929).
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sight of the hut (bohio) which is a stigma upon our ~ivilization."~~
But one could not give the poor and destitute something for nothing. The rebuilding was to be done under the supervision of the
relief agencies and municipal committees by the country people
themselves who were paid for their labor, 10 percent in cash and 90
percent in food rations."
This kind of social engineering also emerged in a plan for
relief developed by representatives of the sugar growers and s u p
ported by Guillermo Esteves, the Commissioner for Puerto Rico.
The plan divided the affected population into three categories:
small owners, the urban working poor, and the am'mados--those
working on the big coffee estates who themselves could be divided between those who lived by cultivating a small plot and those
who resided in small barracks as employees without any land.
Esteves sought to convince the Red Cross that social divisions or
categories within the population had to be treated differently and
that "the good qualities of the Puertorrican small farmer recognized by all" should be stimulated. The small proprietors were of
"good moral charactern and could be trusted to rebuild and
improve their land and did not need to be supervised. Other
groups had to be treated more cautiously.46Above all, he and the
plan opposed moving arrimados from the coffee farms to small
towns; instead, he advocated the building of houses and distribution of small plots to the workers, but only after the haciendas had
recovered and work was available. If work were rushed, the Red
Cross would be forced to bear the burden. Esteves claimed "these
amz'mados love the land they till and they are the seed from which
future farmers will sprout." But his admiration had limitations.
Since the resources of the landowners had to be used in replanting their lands, funds should be given to the landowners who

44. Natalio Bayonet Diaz to Governor of Puerto Rico, 25 September 1928, Obras
publicas, leg. 166, Archivo General de Puerto Rico, San Juan. Much information is also provided in Emilio del Toro, Final Report ofthe Insular Executive
Committee of S u ~ z o and
n Relief (San Juan, P.R, 1929), and in Report on
Danutge by Storm of September 13, 1928: Island of Porto Rico (SanJuan, P.R.,1928),
both produced by the appraisers of the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore,
Porto Rico Branch.
45. Guillermo Esteves to Governor, 15 October 1928, Obras publicas, leg. 166,
and leg. 207, Archivo General de Puerto Rico.
46. Guillermo Esteves to Red Cross Constitutive Committee, 31 October 1928,
Obras publicas, leg. 160 and leg. 166, Archivo General de Puerto Rico.
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could provide the rural laborers with shelter and work. It was a
plan that responded to the specificities of the island's society, but
that once again placed authority and resources in the hands of the
predominant planter class since only its members could provide
for the island's future.
In Florida too there was a desire to rebuild for the future. The
power of the storm had not been shared equally. Bahamian and
other West Indian workers at Belle Glade and other small communities near Lake Okeechobee bore the brunt of the storm. In the
racially differentiated world of 1920s Florida, it was to be expected
that in the effort to relieve and rebuild, differences of color played
a role as well. Attention went to property losses in Delray and Palm
Beach, not to the unnamed bodies swept away by the waters or
burned in communal pyres. The Red Cross, in fact, created a
Colored Advisory Committee that had among its tasks the refutation of "rumors" about aid not being apportioned equally among
blacks and whites. There were problems. The poor had lost homes
that were heavily mortgaged and faced foreclosure. If the Red
Cross reconstructed them, it argued, the lenders rather than the
homeless would profit. So, such homes were not rebuilt. There
were complaints. The Red Cross became defensive in the face of
black criticism. In its final report, it argued, "The Committee,
knowing that its people are receiving their full pro-rata of relief,
cannot but be embarrassed when ungrounded complaints are aired
by chronic kickers.""
Such unpleasantness did not stop progress. South Florida was
committed to ordered growth and agricultural and urban develop
ment. The storm could not be allowed to undermine its trajectory.
In March 1929, before the Director of the Red Cross left Florida,
the West Palm Beach Chamber of Commerce arranged for him to
fly over the area. From the air he saw, as the Red Cross reported,
"Cities, towns and villages had been set in order; cleared streets
were lined with replanted parkings; agricultural lands were drained
and covered with a most luxuriant growth of vegetation that
seemed to have sprung up almost overnight; fields were again s e p
arated by ribbon-like drainage and irrigation canals; the whole
countryside was dotted with reconstructed homes, the new unpaint-

47. American Red Cross, The West Indies Hurricane Disaster (Washington, D.C.,
1928).
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ed lumber glittering brightly in the morning sun." The storm had
not been allowed to alter the road to progress.48
In both Puerto Rico and Florida, the storm had been a disaster,
made so by actions and decisions that long preceded the anival of
the winds. In both places, responses took place within a social and
ideological context that patterned them. Predicting the great trop
ical hurricanes has always been problematical, predicting future
historiography isjust as difficult. This story of the recurring storms
and their interaction with the societies of the Circum-Caribbean,
repeated over the course of five centuries, has provided us a pathway or a metanarrative for understanding in a comparative framework the islands and mainlands of the Caribbean region and their
past. Assuredly, with the coming of each June in the new millennium, the great cyclonic storms will continue to provide opportunities for us to find the commonalities of that history.
48. Ibid.
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